Electronics Home»Top Flaws in Distributed Authentication Systems and how they are Attacked, High Tech, Page 32

Top Flaws in Distributed Authentication Systems and how they are Attacked, High Tech, Page 32

Top Flaws in Distributed Authentication Systems and how they are Attacked

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See entire paper: http://electronics.wesrch.com/pdfEL11TZ3XNMONP
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“Identity Partners” are too trusted.
 If Airforce.mil wants to trust Boeing.com to assert
identities to authorize document access…

 It better be sure that Boeing.com can't assert
@airforce.mil addresses.
 Or @airbus.com addresses, either!

 Often not well accounted for in doc/config options

 Especially problematic for server identities.
 Can Boeing tell “general@airforce.mil” which server is
“fileshare.airforce.mil”? Or just “fileshare”?

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